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Citation: Taleb v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2016 CART 26 |
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Date: 20161020 |
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Docket: CART/CRAC‑1885 |
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BETWEEN: |
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Rabih Hussein Taleb, |
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APPLICANT
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‑ and ‑ |
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Canada Border Services Agency, |
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RESPONDENT
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BEFORE: |
Member Bruce La Rochelle |
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WITH: |
Omar Saoud, representative for the Applicant; and |
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Sherri‑Lynn Foran, representative for the Agency |
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In the matter of an application made by the applicant, pursuant to paragraph 9(2)(c) of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, for a review of the facts of an alleged violation of subsection 16(1) of the Health of Animals Act, alleged by the respondent. |
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DECISION |
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Following a review of all written submissions of the parties, the Canada Agricultural Review Tribunal by order, determines, on the balance of probabilities, that the applicant committed the violation, as set out in Notice of Violation 4312‑16‑0085 dated February 23, 2016, and is therefore liable to pay a monetary penalty of $1,300 within thirty (30) days of the service of this Order on the applicant’s representative. |
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By written submissions only. |
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REASONS
Introduction
[1] This case concerns the alleged failure of the Applicant to present “an animal or thing” contrary to subsection 16(1) of the Health of Animals Act (S.C. 1990, c. 21), which provides as follows:
16 (1) Where a person imports into Canada any animal, animal product, animal by product, animal food or veterinary biologic, or any other thing used in respect of animals or contaminated by a disease or toxic substance, the person shall, either before or at the time of importation, present the animal, animal product, animal by-product, animal food, veterinary biologic or other thing to an inspector, officer or customs officer who may inspect it or detain it until it has been inspected or otherwise dealt with by an inspector or officer.
[2] The specific item which the Applicant failed to present is homemade kashk balls, which the Applicant, a visitor from Lebanon, brought from Lebanon to Canada. There is no dispute that the item is an item to which subsection 16(1) of the Health of Animals Act applies. The only issue is whether the Applicant has established that he is subject to a language impediment in relation to English, as he asserts, and whether such impediment, if established, would provide the Applicant with any recognized defence to the violation as alleged.
[3] The Tribunal notes that, with respect to the importation of otherwise prohibited food items, the Agency has at least two potential legislative directions to rely on in support of its regulatory role. One such direction is that to be considered herein, under subsection 16(1) of the Health of Animals Act. Another is section 40 of the Health of Animals Regulations (C.R.C. c. 296) and its associated sections. Section 40 of the Health of Animals Regulations provides as follows:
40. No person shall import into Canada an animal by-product, manure or a thing containing an animal by-product or manure except in accordance with this Part.
[4] The provisions of the Health of Animals Regulations relating to section 40 thereof and whereby importation may be permitted have been discussed in a number of Tribunal decisions, such as Tao v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2013 CART 16, at paragraphs 3 to 5. As noted in paragraph 5:
[5] The basic regulatory regime, as particularized in the legislative extracts quoted, is that of prohibiting the importation of meat or meat by‑products into Canada from countries other than the United States, unless an import permit has been obtained. In certain cases, a certificate or other document showing how the meat or meat by‑product has been processed may be accepted in place of an import permit. In such cases, the products are permitted to be imported on the basis that the particulars disclosed result in a conclusion that the product would not or would not be likely to introduce particular diseases or contaminants into Canada, and therefore potentially into the Canadian food supply. In addition, an inspector is accorded a particularized discretion to permit the importation of animal by‑products, based on reasonable grounds to believe that the importation of the product, “by its nature, end use or the manner in which it has been processed, would not, or would not be likely to, result in the introduction into Canada of any reportable disease” (s. 41.1(1), Health of Animals Regulations).
[5] It is in the discretion of the Agency as to which violation it chooses to pursue, provided that subsection 16(1) of the Health of Animals Act applies to the action in question. It is to be noted that a violation under section 16(1) of the Health of Animals Act is classified as “very serious” under Schedule 1 of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalty Regulations (SOR/2000‑187), resulting in a monetary penalty of $1,300, pursuant to paragraph 5(1)(c) of these regulations. Pursuant to subsection 5(3) of the Regulations, the monetary penalty is increased to $10,000 if the very serious violation is committed in the course of business or in order to obtain a financial benefit. There is no evidence of either activity or purpose in the present case. In contrast, a violation under section 40 of the Health of Animals Regulations is classified as “serious” under the same Schedule 1, resulting in a monetary penalty of $800 for a “non business” violation, as in the current circumstances.
[6] Thus, through what might appear to be an administrative choice to allege a violation under subsection 16(1) of the Health of Animals Act, rather than under section 40 of the Health of Animals Regulations, the potential monetary penalty increases from $800 to $1,300. However, without challenging the discretion of the Agency in relation to its sectional choice of alleged violation, one question is whether a violation under subsection 16(1) of the Health of Animals Act involves distinct circumstances from those leading to a violation under section 40 of the Health of Animals Regulations. This question need not be addressed further in the present case.
Procedural History
[7] On February 23, 2016, Notice of Violation 4312‑16‑0085 was issued and served on Mr. Taleb, following his entry into Canada at Ottawa, Ontario, by plane from London, England. The flight originated in Beirut, Lebanon (Tab 2, Agency Report). As will be discussed, there was a transposition error in the Notice of Violation, in that the Ottawa street address for Mr. Taleb was at number 2102, while number 2012 was specified in the Notice of Violation.
[8] Mr. Taleb wrote to the Tribunal by letter dated February 25, 2016, received by the Tribunal by ordinary mail on February 29, 2016. This was followed by a letter to the Tribunal dated March 2, 2016, received by registered mail on March 3, 2016. As provided by section 14 of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Regulations (SOR/2000‑187), the Request for Review must in any event be submitted by registered mail, even if submitted otherwise by fax or other electronic means. The Tribunal has no power to vary such regulatory requirements: Reference re section 14 of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations (CA), 2012 FCA 130. The initial submission by Mr. Taleb, via ordinary mail, was therefore ineffective as a Request for Review.
[9] In his Request for Review of March 2, 2016, Mr. Taleb, identifying his address as “2102”, provided the following reasons, as summarized:
(a) Mr. Taleb does not speak or understand English or French (identified as “the languages”).
(b) The food he brought was made by his mother for personal consumption. When he realized that it was illegal to import such food, he asked the customs officer to throw the items in the garbage, while at the same time advising the customs officer that he did not understand “the language”, presumed to refer to English.
(c) He filled in the customs declaration having asked “some travel”, assumed to refer to a fellow traveller, how to fill it in. He completed the paper as he was advised to do. He also filled in the paper in the same way that others were filling it out, following inquiries of others.
(d) During the search, he did not understand what the customs officer was saying (“the languages”). The customs officer is alleged to have “made me sign paper which I didn’t know what that was for” and that he signed, based on believing he had done nothing illegal.
(e) Mr. Taleb gave the customs officer his cousin’s telephone number in Canada, in the hope that the customs officer would call the cousin, but the customs officer did not.
[10] By letter to the parties dated March 8, 2016, sent to both by email and regular mail, accompanied by a copy of the Tribunal Rules (SOR/2015‑103), the parties were advised to provide, by March 23, 2016, additional information prior to a determination of the admissibility of Mr. Taleb’s request. This information requested from the Agency was proof of service plus proof that the penalty had not been paid (Tribunal Rule 30). The information requested from Mr. Taleb was general information if not otherwise provided, such as the choice of official language of the proceedings and particulars of any person representing Mr. Taleb (Tribunal Rule 31).
[11] Presumably further to a telephone conversation with the Tribunal, the Tribunal sent a Naming Representative Form by email dated March 9, 2016, to Mr. Omar Saoud, Mr. Taleb’s brother‑in‑law, for signature and return by Mr. Taleb. The form appears from the file to have been signed by Mr. Taleb on March 9, 2016, and personally delivered that day. At this stage, it became clear that the email address and residential address initially provided by Mr. Taleb were in fact those of Mr. Saoud, his brother‑in‑law. Beyond Mr. Taleb mentioning his unnamed cousin in his Request for Review, the cousin is not apparently engaged further.
[12] By email dated March 9, 2016, the Agency provided to the Tribunal proof of service plus a positive statement that the penalty had not yet been paid.
[13] By letter to the parties, dated March 17, 2016, by email and ordinary mail, the Tribunal advised that parties that Mr. Taleb’s Request for Review had been determined to be admissible, based on “lack of ability to understand English as a defence”. The other grounds advanced by Mr. Taleb—lack of knowledge that the importation was prohibited, or following what others did or told him to do—were not reasons that gave rise to a Request for Review being considered to be admissible. This is because mistake of fact, while recognized as a defence at common law, is explicitly excluded as a defence in relation to absolute liability violations herein. Paragraph 18(1)(b) of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act provides that “A person named in a notice of violation does not have a defence by reason that the person reasonably and honestly believed in the existence of facts that, if true, would exonerate the person.” Based on the decision as to admissibility, the Agency was advised to serve and file its report by April 18, 2016, which it did.
[14] Pursuant to a letter to Mr. Saoud dated April 20, 2016, copied to the Agency, Mr. Saoud was advised of his right, pursuant to Rule 35, to make additional submissions by May 19, 2016, plus his right to advise the Tribunal by the same date as to whether he wished to proceed by way of an oral hearing or by way of written submissions only. Under the new Tribunal Rules, the Applicant does not have to determine how he or she wishes to proceed (oral hearing or written submissions only), until the Applicant has had an opportunity to review the Agency’s written submissions and related evidence in support. Previously, an Applicant was required to indicate his or her procedural choice at the outset of the process.
[15] In response, Mr. Saoud advised the Tribunal by telephone that Mr. Taleb had left Canada. By email dated May 9, 2016, copied to the Agency, the Tribunal inquired as to whether Mr. Saoud continued to represent Mr. Taleb and, if so, how Mr. Saoud wished to proceed. In addition, Mr. Saoud was asked to confirm that he had received the Agency report. At this point, the Tribunal also acknowledged the error in the Notice of Violation in Mr. Saoud’s address (2102, not 2012) and forwarded previously sent Tribunal correspondence to him, which had also been forwarded by email, in any event. By separate email of the same date, which was not copied to the Agency, the Tribunal requested that Mr. Saoud provide Mr. Taleb’s home address, as well as his country of origin. By email dated May 12, 2016, which was not copied to the Agency, Mr. Saoud provided the Tribunal with an address in Lebanon for Mr. Taleb. By separate email of the same date, Mr. Saoud also advised that he continued to represent Mr. Taleb, that he wished to proceed by written submissions and that he had received a copy of the Agency report. This information was copied to the Agency by the Tribunal.
[16] On June 2, 2016, Mr. Saoud and the Agency were advised by email and surface mail, and Mr. Taleb was advised by surface mail, that the case was now ready for a Tribunal decision by written submissions only.
[17] The file was assigned to the current Tribunal member on September 15, 2016.
Facts and Issue
[18] There is no dispute that the item found in Mr. Taleb’s possession is a food item that is prohibited from importation to Canada. It is a home-made Lebanese dish. There is also no dispute that Mr. Taleb did not declare or present this item, prior to its discovery by Agency personnel. The only issue is whether there was a language barrier of such profundity that would provide a defence to Mr. Taleb. As will be discussed, there is a more general issue as to whether a language comprehension impediment or barrier can ever provide a defence to an absolute liability violation.
Assessment of the Evidence
[19] Mr. Taleb asserts that he did not understand either Official Language of Canada, yet was able to make preliminary submissions under his own signature, in English, without evident assistance. Mr. Saoud’s role at that time, if any, is not disclosed and Mr. Saoud has provided no evidence in support of Mr. Taleb’s assertion that he does not comprehend either English or French.
[20] The narrative report of the Agency inspector, supplemented by her notes from the time, indicate detailed conversations with Mr. Taleb, in English. At no point is there an indication that Mr. Taleb had difficulty understanding the circumstances he found himself in or that he requested any form of translation assistance. To the extent that a degree of language impediment would provide a defence to the Notice of Violation, there is none evident in this case. The Tribunal again notes that Mr. Saoud, Mr. Taleb’s representative, provided no evidence to contradict the Agency report in any way whatsovever.
[21] The Tribunal therefore concludes that a language comprehension, if any and if relevant in any event, has not been established by the Applicant. Since this is the only defence raised by the Applicant and which has not been established in any event, on the balance of probabilities, the Applicant is considered to have committed the violation as alleged.
Common Law Defences and Language Comprehension
[22] The Tribunal wishes to address whether a language impediment can ever be viewed as a valid defence, in an absolute liability regime. The limited defences available in relation to an absolute liability violation are particularized in section 18 of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act (S.C. 1995, c. 40) as follows:
18. (1) A person named in a notice of violation does not have a defence by reason that the person
(a) exercised due diligence to prevent the violation or
(b) reasonably and honestly believed in the existence of facts that, if true, would exonerate the person.
(2) Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any circumstance a justification or excuse in relation to a charge for an offence under an agri-food Act applies in respect of a violation to the extent that it is not inconsistent with this Act.
[23] Subsection 18(2) of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act is based on comparable provisions found in the Criminal Code of Canada. Subsection 8(3) of the Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46) provides as follows:
8. (3) Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any circumstance a justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge continues in force and applies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act or any other Act of Parliament except in so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or any other Act of Parliament.
[24] The nature of common law defences permitted under subsection 18(2) of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act was discussed by the Tribunal in Ziha v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2013 CART 13, at paragraphs 30 to 32, as follows (and largely duplicating the Tribunal’s reasoning in Gebru v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2013 CART 2, at paragraphs 48 to 50):
[30] A useful summary of absolute liability offences and the defences available in relation thereto is found in the decision rendered by Justice of the Peace Dechert in R. v. Stokes, 2009 ONCJ 8 (CanLII). In Stokes, the applicant was charged with failing to stop at a stop sign, which is an absolute liability offence pursuant to the Ontario Highway Traffic Act. Unlike the present case where, under section 19 of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, the burden of proof is the balance of probabilities, the burden of proof in Stokes was beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof for the defence is nevertheless the balance of probabilities.
[31] As pointed out in Stokes (in paragraph [8]), with respect to an absolute liability offence, all that the prosecution needs to establish is that the prohibited act occurred. Proof of intent is not required. It is then for the accused to raise such defences as might be available at common law. As specified in subsection 18(1) of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, due diligence is not a permitted defence, nor is an honest belief that the act was lawful. What defences are therefore available to Mr. Ziha? As discussed in Stokes, in paragraphs [8], [9] and [10]:
[8] Accordingly, once the prosecutor has established the actus reus of the subject offence, the mental element of negligence is automatically imported into the offence. The defendant is then liable to be found guilty of the offence, unless he/she is able to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the existence of a common law defence which would excuse or justify his/her actions in committing the prohibited act.
[9] The defence of due diligence; being that either the defendant took all reasonable care to avoid committing the offence or that in committing the offence acted under a honest and reasonable mistake of fact, is not available as a defence to offences of absolute liability. As stated by Dickson J., on behalf of the Supreme Court of Canada, in the seminal case of Regina v. Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 CanLII 11 (SCC), (1978) 2 S.C.R. 1299; 40 C.C.C. (2d) 354 (S.C.C.), offences of absolute liability are those offences “where it is not open to the accused to exculpate himself by showing that he was free from fault”.
[10] As indicated above, certain common law defences which either justify or excuse a defendant’s actions in committing the actus reus of an offence, apply to absolute liability offences. As stated in the case of Regina v. Metro News Ltd., 1986 CanLII 148 (ON CA), (1986), 56 O.R. (2d) 321 (Ont. C.A.), defences such as insanity, automatism or duress are available for absolute liability offences. Furthermore, in its decision in Regina v. Cancoil Thermal Corp., 1986 CanLII 154 (ON CA), (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 295 (Ont. C.A.), at pp 301and 302, the Ontario Court of Appeal made the following comments relative to the issues of defences applicable to absolute liability offences:
Even in offences of absolute liability, where “it is not open to the accused to exculpate himself by showing that he was free of fault” (R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), supra.), there is no reason why other general defences should not be available such as necessity, duress and coercion: see Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 5th ed., pp 100-1. The usual defences are available, except the defences of lack of intention, etc.: see Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1978), at p. 906.
[32] Thus, the common defences available to Mr. Ziha primarily relate to impairment of volition, such as insanity, automatism, duress, coercion, as well as necessity…
[25] What is unclear is whether a language barrier, if established, may be viewed as a form of common law defence going to lack of volition. At present, there does not appear to be a strong judicial direction supporting a view that a lack of understanding the language relating to the violation may be regarded as a common law defence. What is recognized as a defence is a lack of volition due to a mental impairment or compulsion through external circumstances. Since ignorance of the law is not recognized, of itself, as a common law defence, ignorance of the law due to language impediment would appear to fall within the same category. This was referenced by the Tribunal in Gebru v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2013 CART 2, at paragraph 52:
[52] The Tribunal holds that the defences advanced by Ms. Gebru, primarily relating to her lack of understanding of English, have been successfully rebutted by the Agency, through contrary facts advanced by the Agency. The Tribunal further holds that, even if facts as alleged by Ms. Gebru were established to the satisfaction of the Tribunal, they are irrelevant as defences to the violation in question. This is because, as has been noted, and as is provided in the legislation, the offences are absolute liability offences. It is the fact of finding butter in Ms. Gebru’s luggage that gives rise to the violation. Her understanding of the circumstances when food products are or are not permitted to be transported into Canada is irrelevant. Ms. Gebru has advanced none of the recognized defences to an absolute liability offence, such as necessity, duress, or coercion.
[26] In the absence of a judicial determination that a language impediment may be categorized as a common law defence to the commission of an absolute violation, the Tribunal is not prepared to so hold of its own volition. In “Common Law Defences” a 1992 paper published by the Canadian Bar Association (accessible at http://www.lareau-law.ca/CBA16‑‑Ferguson.pdf), the nature of the subsection 8(3) Criminal Code provision is discussed by Professor Gerry Ferguson, of the University of Victoria law school, as follows, in part:
1. Section 8(3) of the Criminal Code states:
Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any circumstance a justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge continues in force and applies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act or any other Act of Parliament except insofar as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or any other Act of Parliament.
2. Section 8(3) has been in the Criminal Code since its enactment in 1892. This provision was necessary since the Canadian codifiers made no pretense to attempting to comprehensively codify all existing common law defences. The Canadian codifiers relied upon the view of the English Draft Criminal Code Commissioners of 1880 who were of the view that it would be exceedingly difficult to anticipate every future defence with acceptable precision.
3. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen favoured this approach for the following reasons:
[Quoted in G.L. Williams, “Necessity” (1978) Crim. L. Rev. at 129‑130] (quotation edited by the Tribunal)
…we are surely in a position to say the power of declaring new offences shall henceforth be vested in Parliament only. The power which has at times been claimed for the judges of declaring new offences cannot be useful now, whatever may have been its value in earlier times.
On the other hand, it is hardly possible to foresee all the circumstances which might possibly justify or excuse acts which might otherwise be crimes. A long series of authorities have settled certain rules which can be put into a distinct and convenient form…but is it therefore wise or safe to go so far as to say that no other circumstances than those expressly enumerated shall operate by way of excuse or justification for what would otherwise be a crime…
…the reason why the common law definitions of offences should be taken away, while the common law principles as to justification and excuse are kept alive, is like the reason why the benefit of a doubt should be given to a prisoner.
4. Section 8(3) has been relied upon in Canada for uncodified defences such as intoxication, automatism, mistake of fact, officially induced error, necessity, entrapment, de minimis, due diligence for strict liability offences, and the common law defence of duress for parties to an offence other than the principal offender.
5. The advantage of section 8(3) is that it has facilitated a certain degree of growth in the area of common law defences…
[27] It remains to be seen whether a linguistic impediment of a particular degree will come to be regarded as a common law defence under subsection 18(2) of the Agriculture and Agri‑Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act. This question need not be addressed further here, though the Tribunal notes in passing that the common law defence of mistake of fact, which would appear to be associated with or a consequence of a linguistic impediment, is specifically eliminated as a defence by paragraph 18(1)(b). Thus, an underlying question remains whether, at this point in time, an allegation of linguistic impediment is an admissible reason in support of a Request for Review. On one reflection of matters, if language comprehension impediments are considered to relate to mistake of fact, the Request for Review in this case perhaps should not have been considered admissible at the outset.
[28] From another perspective, if language comprehension impediments go to the issue of volition, where a mistake cannot be said to have been voluntarily made, the matter may require further reflection. In Abou‑Latif v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2013 CART 35, involving an oral hearing, the Applicant was represented in English by his wife, and did not speak at the hearing. Through his representative, the Applicant asserted, for the first time at the hearing, that he had a minimal understanding of English and no understanding of French. In paragraphs 34 to 37 of Abou‑Latif, Tribunal addressed impediment to language comprehension as a potential impairment of volition, as follows:
[34] The Tribunal has noted…that certain common law defences remain available to the applicant, on the basis that such defences are not inconsistent with the governing legislation. Such defences primarily relate to impairment of volition. It may be that a complete lack of understanding of either Official Language of Canada could be viewed as an impairment of volition, though that need not be determined in the present case. In the agreed statement of facts, Mr. Abou‑Latif was asked if he had anything to declare and was able to answer “sweets” and “peanuts”. Furthermore, in cross‑examination, he acknowledged that he received help in completing the declaration form on the plane from someone whose understanding of English was superior to his own. It may be reasonably assumed that any points of concern that Mr. Abou‑Latif had in understanding the form would have been addressed through conversation in Arabic between Mr. Abou‑Latif and his fellow passenger.
[35] In the recent Tribunal decision of Dao v. Canada (CBSA), 2013 CART 31, Mr. Dao asserted that he did not understand English, and was represented at the hearing by another family member. At the hearing, there was refutational evidence provided by an inspector, detailed in paragraph 14 of the decision, as follows:
[14] In cross‑examination, Inspector 14984 told the Tribunal that she believed that Dao did understand English well enough to understand the questions she was asking him and indicated that she simplified her questions to ensure that he would understand. She added that if she had been convinced that Dao was not understanding her questions she would have called for an interpreter to come and assist them. The fact that Dao argued with her to have all the documentation in his name convinced her that Dao understood and spoke English…
[36] Similar refutational evidence, as found in Dao, was not available in the current case, as the Agency personnel involved with the discovery and seizure of the prohibited meat product were not in attendance at the hearing… In fairness to the Agency representative, there was no information provided by Mr. Abou‑Latif in advance of the hearing that his language limitations would be part of his defence. In more usual circumstances, where the elements of an applicant’s defence are communicated in advance, the Agency would have been in a position to seek to submit written representations current or former Agency personnel, in circumstances where such persons were not available to testify at the hearing.
[37] In the present case, the Tribunal finds that Mr. Abou‑Latif’s impediments to understanding the English language, both generally and in circumstances where he requested translation assistance on the airplane, were not such as to be considered to be an impediment to volition. In this regard, Mr. Abou‑Latif is in a similar position to that of the applicant in Dao. Mr. Abou‑Latif may have difficulties understanding English, but his difficulties in understanding did not extend to a complete inability to appreciate the nature and consequences of his actions.
[29] In the present case, as previously noted, any alleged language impediment of the Applicant is not supported by evidence. Thus, issues relating to mistake of fact or impairment of volition need not be considered further.
Applicant No Longer in Canada
[30] The Tribunal notes that the Applicant is no longer in Canada, but remains represented in Canada. Notice to the Applicant’s representative is therefore considered to be notice to the Applicant.
Conclusion
[31] Following a review of all written submissions of the parties, the Canada Agricultural Review Tribunal by order, determines, on the balance of probabilities, that the applicant committed the violation, as set out in Notice of Violation 4312‑16‑0085 dated February 23, 2016, and is therefore liable to pay a monetary penalty of $1,300 within thirty (30) days of the service of this Order on the applicant’s representative.
Dated at Ottawa, Ontario, this 20th day of October, 2016.
_____________________________________________
Dr. Bruce La Rochelle, Member